Forsiden Aktuelt Forskningsenheter Forskning/prosjekter Publikasjoner Presse Om FFI Verksted Kontakt oss
 
Forsvaret.no : Fellesinstitusjoner : Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt :

Innhold


Postadresse:
Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt
Postboks 25
2027 Kjeller

Besøksadresse Kjeller:
Instituttveien 20

Telefon: 63 80 70 00
Militær tlf: 0505 7000
Telefaks: 63 80 71 15

Besøksadresse Horten:
Karljohansvern
Telefon Horten: 33 03 38 00

E-post FFI
E-post INFO
E-post Nettredaktør
 

Forkortelser
  • ABCAtomic, Biological, Chemical (kjernefysisk, biologisk, kjemisk)
  • ABMAnti-ballistic missile (rakettvernmissil)
  • ACEEuropakommandoen i NATO
  • ACLANTAtlanterhavskommandoen i NATO
  • ACOAllied Command Operations
  • ACTAllied Command Transformation
  • AETAgency Establishment Team
  • AEWAirborne Early Warning (fly som brukes til tidlig varsling)
  • AFCENTAllied Forces Central Europe (Sentralkommandoen i Europa)
  • AFNORTHNATOs nordkommando
  • AFNORTH-WESTAllied Forces Northwestern Europe
  • AFSOUTHAllied Forces Southern Europe (Sørkommandoen i Europa)
  • AGSAlliance Ground Surveillance
  • AIRNORTH-WESTPSC for Air Forces, Northwestern Europe
  • ALCMAir-launched cruise missile (kryssermissil som leveres fra fly)
  • AMEC-avtalenArctic Military Environmental Cooperation
  • AMFAllied Command Europe Mobile Force (Den raske innsatsstyrken (brannkorpset) i NATO)
  • AMRAAMAdvanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (avansert luft-til-luft-missil med middels rekkevidde) - siden 1995 har Norge brukt dette som et bakke-til-luft missil i det norskproduserte luftvernsystemet NASAMS.
  • ARBCAtom-/kjernefysiske, radiologiske, biologiske og kjemiske stridsmidler
  • ARGUSForsvarets omstillingsprogram
  • ARRCAce Rapid Reaction Corps
  • ARSAir Control Centre, Recognized air picture production centre and Sensor fusion post
  • ASBMAir-to-surface-ballistic-missile
  • ASMAir-to-surface-missile
  • ASOCAir Support Operation Center
  • ASRAAMAdvanced short-range air-to-air missile (avansert luft-til-luft missil med kort rekkevidde)
  • ASTAvgangsstimulerende tiltak
  • ASWAnti-submarine warfare (anti-ubåt krigføring)
  • ATS/NAlliert treningssenter nord
  • ATS/SAlliert treningssenter sør
  • AUVAutonom undervannsfarkost
  • AWACSAirborne Warning and Control System (luftbårent varslings- og kontrollsystem)
  • BALTAPBaltic Approaches (i NATOs kommando for Østersjø-områdene)
  • BALTBATBaltic Peacekeeping Battalion (Fellesbaltisk bataljon for fredsoperasjoner)
  • BALTDEFCOLBaltic Defence College (Fellesbaltisk stabsskole)
  • BALTNETBaltic Communication Network (Fellesbaltisk kontroll- og luftovervåkningssystem)
  • BALTRATFellesbaltisk bataljon for fredsoperasjoner
  • BALTRONBaltic Squadron (Fellesbaltisk mineryddingsskvadron)
  • BALTSEABaltic Security Assistance Group
  • BFOBefalets Fellesorganisasjon
  • BrigBrigade
  • BSBefalsskole
  • BTUBefalstiltaksutvalget
  • C 3Consultation, Command and Control (Konsultasjon, kommando og kontroll)
  • CAOCCombined Air Operation Centre
  • CCISCommand, Control and Information System (Kommando-, kontroll- og informasjonssystem)
  • CDConference on Disarmament (Nedrustningskonferansen)
  • CDEConcept Development and Expermimentation
  • CFEConventional Forces in Europe (avtale om konvensjonelle styrker i Europa)
  • CFSPCommon Foreign and Security Policy
  • CHESSChemical Health and Environment Safety System
  • CIMICCivilian Military Cooperation (sivilt-militært samarbeid)
  • CJTFCombined Joint Task Force (Flernasjonal innsatsstyrke satt sammen fra flere forsvarsgrener - i Nato)
  • CMXKrisehåndteringsøvelse i NATO
  • CNADConference of National Armaments Directors
  • CNOComputer Network Operations
  • CNOTGCommander Norwegian Task Group
  • COBCollocated Operating Bases (forhåndsklargjorte flystasjoner)
  • COECentres of Excellence
  • COMAOComposite Air Operations
  • COSSForsvarets kystovervåkningssystem
  • CPCheck Point, kontrollpost
  • CRCold Response (navn på vinterøvelse)
  • CRCControl and Reporting Centre
  • CSARCombat Search and Rescue (Oppdage, lokalisere, identifisere og hente ut nedskutte flybesetningsmedlemmer og isolert militært personell i nød, innenfor et operasjonsteater, i krise og krig.)
  • CSBMConfidence and Security Building Measures (tillits- og sikkerhetsskapende tiltak)
  • CSS-bataljonenCombat support service-bataljonen
  • CTGCommandor Task Group
  • CTUCommanding Task Unit
  • CWOCold Weather Operations
  • DCIDefence Capability Initiative
  • DCJTFDeployable Combined Joint Task Force (Mobil flernasjonal innsatsstyrke satt sammen fra flere forsvarsgrener - i Nato)
  • DFSDet frivillige Skyttervesen
  • DFSSjøforsvarets dykker- og froskemannskole
  • DKDistriktskommando
  • DKTDistriktskommando Trøndelag
  • DIFDriftsenhet i Forsvaret
  • DPCDefence Planning Committee (Forsvarsplanleggingskomiteen i NATO)
  • DSBDirektoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap (tidligere Direktoratet for sivilt beredskap).
  • EAPCEuro-Atlantic Partnership Council (Det euro-atlantiske partnerskapsråd)
  • EBAEiendom, bygg og anlegg
  • EDUSEtatens direkte underlagte sjefer (avdelinger som rapporterer til Forsvarsstaben)
  • EEAWEuropean Expeditionary Air Wing
  • EKElektronisk krigføring
  • EODExplosive Ordnance Disposal
  • EPAFEuropean Participating Air Forces (flysamarbeid)
  • ESDIEuropean Security and Defence Identity Europeisk dikkerhets- og forsvarsidentitet)
  • EMKDen europeiske menneskerettighetskonvensjon
  • EMDDen europeiske menneskerettighetsdomstol i Strasbourg
  • ENOEtter nærmere ordre
  • ERKEksplosivryddekommando
  • ESDPEuropean Security- and Defence Policy
  • EUDen europeiske union
  • EUCLIDEuropean Collaborative Long Term Initiative in Defence (teknologiprogram VEU)
  • EURO-CORPSEuropean Corps
  • EWEarly warning (tidlig varsling)
  • FAAForsvarets arkivadministrasjon (Lillehammer)
  • FABCForsvarets ABC-skole
  • FAESForsvarets ammunisjon og EOD-skole
  • FAKTForsvarets avdeling for kultur og tradisjon
  • FAWEUForces Answerable to WEU (Styrker innmeldt til Den vesteuropeiske union)
  • FBForsvarsbygg
  • FBOTForsvarets boligtjeneste
  • FBTForsvarets bygningstjeneste
  • FDForsvarsdepartementet
  • FDIForsvarsdistrikt
  • FDNForsvarets digitale (sambands-)nett
  • FDUSForsvarssjefen direkte underlagte sjefer (avdelinger som rapporterer direkte til forsvarssjefen)
  • FFIForsvarets forskningsinstitutt
  • FFLForsvarets farmasøytiske laboratorium
  • FFRForsvarets forskningspolitiske råd
  • FHSForsvarets høyskole
  • FIFFelles integrert forvaltningssystem
  • FIHForsvarets ingeniørhøgskole
  • FISForsvarets informasjonssystem
  • FISBASISFelles informasjonssystem for Forsvaret
  • FISTForsvarets innsatsstyrke (enten for Hær, Sjø eller Luft)
  • FKDFForsvarets konsept- og doktrineforum
  • FKKISForsvarets kompetansesenter for kommando, kontroll og informasjonssystemer (på Jørstadmoen, Lillehammer).
  • FKLForsvarets kompetansesenter logistikk (på Sessvollmoen).
  • FKNForsvarskommando Nord-Norge
  • FKSForsvarskommando Sør-Norge
  • FKVForsvarets kompetansesenter vognførerutdanning
  • FLAForsvarets lønnsadministrasjon (i Harstad)
  • FLOForsvarets logistikkorganisasjon
  • FLO/IKTForsvarets logistikkorganisasjon, divisjon for informasjons- og kommunikasjonstjenester
  • FLSKForsvarets logistikkskole
  • FLYSTNFlystasjon
  • FMGTForsvarets militærgeografiske tjeneste
  • FMKNForsvarets distriktsmusikkorps Nord-Norge
  • FMOForsvarets militære organisasjon
  • FMPAForsvarets militærpolitiavdeling
  • FMSForsvarets mediesenter
  • FMUForsvarsmuseet
  • FNDe forente nasjoner
  • FNIFridtjof Nansens Institutt
  • FOForsvarets overkommando (erstattet av Forsvarsstaben)
  • FOBIDForsvarets Oversikt over Bestemmelser, Instrukser og Direktiver
  • FOCFull Operational Capability
  • FOHForsvarets operative hovedkvarter
  • FOHKFellesoperativt hovedkvarter (i Stavanger)
  • FOKIVForsvarets kompetansesenter for internasjonal virksomhet
  • FOLForsvarets operative ledelse, en fellesbetegnelse for øverste ledelse av Forsvarets operative virksomhet. Består av Fellesoperativt hovedkvarter (FOHK) i Stavanger, samt det underlagte hovedkvarteret Landsdelskommando Nord-Norge (LDKN) i Bodø.
  • FOPVFellesoperativt planverk. Sammen med forsvarssjefens strategiske direktiv for operasjoner er FOPV grunnlag for utvikling av et nasjonalt fellesoperativt planverk.
  • FOSFelles opptak og seleksjon
  • FOUForskning og utvikling
  • FPDSForsvarets programvare og digitalnettsenter
  • FPFForsvarets Pensjonistforbund
  • FPUForsvarspolitisk utvalg
  • FRAForsvarets regnskapsadministrasjon (i Bergen)
  • FrGForsvarets relokalisering Gardermoen
  • FRJDen føderale republikken Jugoslavia
  • FRMForsvarets rekrutterings- og mediesenter (ble fra oktober 2002 erstattet av FMS, Forsvarets mediesenter)
  • FROGFree rocket over ground (sovjetisk bakke-til-bakkerakett)
  • FSForsvarsstudie
  • FSAForsvarets sikkerhetsavdeling
  • FSANForsvarets sanitet
  • FSESForsvarets skole i etterretning og sikkerhet
  • FSJForsvarssjefen
  • FSJ MFU 03Forsvarssjefens militærfaglige utredning 2003
  • FSKForsvarets spesialkommando
  • FSSForsvarets skolesenter
  • FSTForsvarsstaben
  • FSTLForsvarets sivile tjenestemenns landsforbund. Nå heter det Personellforbundet
  • FTDForsvarets tele- og datatjeneste, nå er tjenesten organisert i FLO/IKT
  • FOSTForsvarets sikkerhetstjeneste
  • FUDForsvarets utfasingsdatabase
  • FUSPFelles utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk
  • FYROMFormer Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia
  • GBADOCGround Based Air Defence Operation Center
  • GBUGrunnleggende befalsutdanning
  • GIGeneralinspektør
  • GIHGeneralinspektøren for Hæren
  • GIHVGeneralinspektøren for Heimevernet
  • GILGeneralinspektøren for Luftforsvaret
  • GISGeneralinspektøren for Sjøforsvaret. (Kan også stå for Geografiske informasjonssystemer i forbindelse med Forsvarets militærgeografiske tjeneste)
  • GOUGrunnleggende offisersutdanning
  • GSVGarnisonen i Sør-Varanger
  • HELHoldninger, etikk og ledelse
  • HFKHærens forsyningskommando (erstattet av virksomheten i Forsvarets logistikkorganisasjon)
  • HFLYSTNHovedflystasjon
  • HJKHærens jegerkommando
  • HMKGHans Majestet Kongens Garde
  • HOPHelhetlig omstillingsplan
  • HRSHurtig reaksjonsstyrke
  • HSHorisontal samhandel
  • HSTYHærens styrker
  • HVHeimevernet
  • IAEAInternational Atomic Energy Agency (Det internasjonale atomenergibyrå)
  • ICAOCInterim Combined Air Operation Centre
  • ICBMInter-continental Ballistic Missile (Interkontinental ballistisk missil)
  • ICCInternational Criminal Court (internasjonale straffedomstol)
  • ICJInternational Court of Justice i Haag
  • IFSInstitutt for forsvarsstudier
  • IISSInternational Institute for Strategic Studies (Det internasjonale instituttet for strategiske studier)
  • IKTInformasjons- og kommunikasjonsteknologi
  • IKVIndre Kystvakt
  • IMSInternational Military Staff (Den internasjonale militære staben i NATO)
  • IRFImmediate Reaction Forces (NATOs styrker for innsetting på kort varsel)
  • ISInternational Staff (NATOs sivile sekretariat)
  • ISInformasjonssystemer
  • ISAFInternational Security Assistance Force (i Afghanistan)
  • ISLIntegrert strategisk ledelse (begrepet er nå erstattet med den strategiske ledelsen i Forsvaret)
  • ISTARIntelligence, Surveilance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (etterretning, overvåkning, målvalg og oppklaring)
  • ITInformasjonsteknologi
  • JALLCJoint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre
  • JSFJoint Strike Fighter
  • JMCJoint Military Commission, det internasjonale nærværet i Sudan
  • JWCJoint Warfare Centre, Natos treningssenter i Stavanger
  • K&VKontroll & varsling
  • KAKystartilleri
  • KAMPUKSKampvåpenets utdannings- og kompetansesenter
  • KFBKvinners Frivillige Beredskap
  • KFORKosovo Force
  • KKISKommando, kontroll og informasjonssystemer
  • KMNBKabul Multinational Brigade
  • KNEKonferansen om nedrusting i Europa
  • KNMKongelige norske marine
  • KOLKrigsskoleutdannede offiserers landsforening
  • KOPKrigsoppsettingsplaner
  • KSKrigsskole
  • KVKystvakten
  • KYPKystmeldepost (Sjøheimevernet)
  • LDKNLandsdelskommando Nord-Norge (Reitan ved Bodø)
  • LDKSLandsdelskommando Sør-Norge (i Trondheim)
  • LFLandforsvar
  • LFKLuftforsvarets forsyningskommando (erstattet av virksomheten i Forsvarets logistikkorganisasjon)
  • LKVSLuftforsvarets kontroll- og varslingsskole
  • LOGSTRATLogistikkstrategi
  • LOGUKSLogistikkvåpenets utdannings- og kompetansesenter
  • LOSLuftovervåkning og stridsledelse
  • LSTNLuftforsvarsstasjon
  • LTFLandsutvalget for tillitsvalgte i Forsvaret
  • LUHVLuftheimevernet
  • LUKSLuftforsvarets utdannings- og kompetansesenter
  • MAPMembership action plan
  • MCMFORMEDMine Counter Measures Force Mediterranean (Natos mineryddestyrke i Middelhavet).
  • MCMFORNORTHMine Counter Measures Force North (Natos mineryddestyrke i nordlige farvann).
  • MDMilitærdistrikt
  • MEBMarine Expeditionary Brigade (marineekspedisjonsbrigade)
  • MFOMultinational Force and Observers (Den internasjonale fredsstyrken i Sinai)
  • MFUMilitærfaglig utredning (forsvarssjefens militærfaglige utredning)
  • MIRVMultiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle (flermåls uavhengig styrbare missilstridshoder)
  • MJKMarinejegerkommandoen
  • MLRSMultilaunch rocket system
  • MNCMajor NATO Command
  • MONUAFNs observatørmisjon i Angola (tidligere en del av UNAVEMIII)
  • MoUMemorandum of Understanding (rammeavtale)
  • MPmilitærpoliti
  • MRBMMedium-range ballistic missile (ballistiske mellomdistansemissil)
  • MSCMajor Subordinate Command
  • MTAMaritime Patrol Aircraft
  • MTBMissiltorpedobåt
  • MUKSMilitærmedisinsk utdannings- og kompetansesenter (lokalisert til Sessvollmoen)
  • NACNorth Atlantic Council (Det nord-atlantiske råd)
  • NACCNorth Atlantic Cooperation Council (Det nord-atlantiske samarbeidsråd)
  • NAEWNATO airborne early warning (NATOs luftbårne varslingssystem)
  • NALLADSNorwegian Low Level Air Defence Systems
  • NALMEBNorway Air Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade (amerikanske styrker som har forhåndslager i Norge)
  • NAMSANATO Materiel Supply Agency (NATOs organ for materiellforsyninger)
  • NASAMSNorwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System
  • NATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Den nord-atlantiske traktats organisasjon)
  • NAUNATO Accounting Units
  • NAVNORTH-WESTPSC for Naval Forces, Northwestern Europe
  • NBFNettverksbasert Forsvar
  • NCCNational Contingent Commander (nasjonal kontingentsjef)
  • NCFNATO Composite Force
  • NCRSNATO Crises Response System
  • NEAFCDen nordøst-atlantiske fiskerikommisjon
  • NFFNorges Forsvarsforening
  • NGONon-Governmental Organisations
  • NILUNordic Integrated Logistics Unit (Nordisk logistikkenhet, Kabul, Afghanistan)
  • NLFNorges Lotteforbund
  • NOAHNorwegian Adapted Hawk
  • NOBLENorwegian Battle Lab and Experimentation
  • NOFNorges Offisersforbund
  • NONDCThe Norwegian National Defence College, Forsvarets høyskole
  • NORCCISNorwegian Command, Control and Information System (Norsk automatisk kommandokontroll- og informasjonssystem)
  • NOR-DACNordic Armaments cooperation
  • NORDCAPSNordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support
  • NORDPOLBRIGNordisk polsk brigade i SFOR
  • NORTaC-C2ISNorwegian Tactical and Combat Command and Controle System
  • NORMANSNorwegian Modular Arctic Network Soldier
  • NORTFNorwegian Task Force (norsk styrke i Kosovo)
  • NOUNorges offentlige utredninger
  • NPTNon-Proliferation Treaty (Ikke-spredningsavtalen)
  • NRFNato Response Force (Natos reaksjonsstyrke)
  • NROFNorske Reserveoffiserers Forbund
  • NSM1) Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet (tidligere sikkerhetstjenesten) 2) Nye sjømålsmissiler
  • NSRSNato Submarine Rescue System
  • NSTNuclear and Space Arms Talk (forhandlinger om rom- og atomvåpen)
  • NUCNATO-Ukraina Commision
  • NUPINorsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt
  • OEFOperation Enduring Freedom (i Afghanistan)
  • OMSOslo Militære Samfund
  • OPObservation Point, observasjonspost
  • OPL/FOppsetningsplan/fred (i fredstid)
  • OPPOffentlig privat partnerskap, samlebegrep for OPS, konkuranseutsetting og bortsetting)
  • OPSOffentlig privat samarbeid. I forbindelse med operativ virksomhet: Ops-rom = operasjonsrom, int.ops = internasjonale operasjoner
  • OSSEOrganisasjonen for sikkerhet og samarbeid i Europa
  • PARPPlanning and Review Process
  • PCCPrague Capabilities Commitment
  • PfPPartnership for Peace (Partnerskap for fred)
  • PIOPresse- og informasjonsoffiser
  • PJCPermanent Joint Council (Det permanente samarbeidsråd mellom NATO og Russland)
  • PODPersonell, operasjoner og drift (avdeling i Forsvarsstaben) Fra 22. aug -05 nytt navn: PØS.
  • POCPoint of Contact
  • PRIOPeace Research Institute, Oslo (Fredsforskningsinstituttet)
  • PRTProvincial Reconstruction Team (internasjonale avdelinger under ISAF i Afghanistan).
  • PSCPrincipal Subordinate Command
  • PSC NORTHPrincipal Subordinate Command North
  • PØSPersonell, økonomi og styringsstaben
  • QRFQuick Reaction Force (Hurtig utrykningsstyrke)
  • RACRegional Area Command (Regionalt ISAF-hovedkvarter, Afghanistan)
  • RAC-NRegional Area Command - North (Regionalt ISAF-hovedkvarter for nordområdene i Afghanistan)
  • RCRegional Command (Regional kommando)
  • RFFRammefordelingsforslag
  • ROForsvarets ressursorganisasjon
  • RRFRapid Reaction Force (NATOs styrker for rask utrykning)
  • RoERules of Engagement (nasjonale regler for deltakelse i operasjoner)
  • RRPRapid Reinforcement Plan (SACEURs plan for rask forsterkning)
  • RSFRegional støttefunksjon
  • SACSupreme Allied Commander
  • SACEURSupreme Allied Commander Europe (Øverstkommanderende for de allierte stridskreftene i Europa)
  • SACLANTSupreme Allied Commander Atlantic (Øverstkommanderende for de allierte stridskreftene i Atlanterhavsområdet)
  • SACTSupreme Allied Command, Transformation
  • SALTStrategic Arms Limitation Talks (forhandlinger om reduksjoner av strategiske våpen)
  • SAMSurface-to-air missile (bakke-/overflate-til-luft missil)
  • SARSearch and rescue
  • SBUKSUtdannings- og kompetansesenter for Hærens Samband
  • SCANCOYScandinavian Company (FYROM)
  • SCCSealift Coordination Centre
  • SCGSpecial Consultative Group (Den spesielle rådgivende gruppe)
  • SCNEStrategic Command Northern Europe
  • SDSjøforsvarsdistrikt
  • SDIStrategic Defense Initiative (det strategiske forsvarsinitiativ)
  • SFORStabilisation Force (Den NATO-ledede fredsstyrken i Bosnia-Hercegovina)
  • SHAPESupreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (hovedkvarteret for de allierte stridskreftene i Europa)
  • SHIRBRIGUN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade (beredskapsstyrke for FN)
  • SHVSjøheimevernet
  • SIBOStrid i bebygd område
  • SLBMSubmarine-launched ballistic missile (ballistisk missil som leveres fra u-båt)
  • SLCMSea-launched cruice missile (kryssermissil som leveres fra utskytningsenhet til sjøs)
  • SLOCSea-lines of communication (sjøverts forbindelseslinjer over Atlanterhavet)
  • SOFSpecial Operations Forces
  • SOPStandard Operating Procedure
  • SRBSenior Resource Board
  • SRBMShort-range ballistic missile (ballistisk kortdistansemissil)
  • SRINFShort-range intermediate nuclear forces (mellomdistanse kjernefysiske styrker med kort rekkevidde)
  • SSBNBallistic missile nuclear submarine (atomdrevet u-båt utstyrt med interkontinentale ballistiske missiler)
  • SSMSurface-to-surface missile (bakke-til-bakkemissil)
  • SSNSubmarine, nuclear (atomdrevet u-båt)
  • STANAV-FOR-LANTStanding Naval Force Atlantic
  • ST MELDStortingsmelding
  • ST PRPStortingsproposisjon
  • STARTStrategic Arms Reduction Talks (forhandlinger om reduksjon av strategiske våpen)
  • STOLShort take-off and landing (dvs. flytype som kan bruke kort rullebane)
  • STSJStabssjef
  • STYFOR(Virksomhet,- styring og organisering av materiellforvaltningen i Forsvaret)
  • SØRSkyte-, øvings- og regionfelt
  • TADKOMTaktisk, digitalt kommunikasjonssystem
  • TBSTaktisk Båtskvadron
  • TEFTheatre Enabling Force (Klargjøringsstyrke som forbereder infrastruktur i leirområder)
  • TMBNTelemark bataljon
  • TMOTillitsmannsordningen i Forsvaret
  • TOTEXTotalforsvarsøvelsen
  • TRADOKTransformasjons- og doktrinekommandoen (i Hæren)
  • TTFTelemark Task Force (i Afghanistan)
  • TVDTeatr Vojennyk Dejstvij (russ: geografisk avdelte strategiske operasjonsteater)
  • UAVUnmanned Aerial Vehicle, ubemannet luftfarkost
  • UKSUtdannings- og kompetansesenter
  • UNIFILUnited Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon
  • UNMOPUnited Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (FNs observatørmisjon i Prevlaka i Det tidligere Jugoslavia)
  • UNPREDEPUnited Nations Preventive Deployment Force (Makedonia)
  • UNPROFORUnited Nations Protection Force (Bosnia-Hercegovina) (FNs fredsopprettende styrke i Bosnia-Hercegovina)
  • UNTAESUnited Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
  • UNTSOUnited Nations Truce Supervision Organization (FNs organisasjon for våpenstillstandsovervåkning i Midtøsten)
  • USKUtskrevet (befal)
  • USMCUS Marine Corps (Det amerikanske marinekorpset)
  • UVBUndervannsbåt
  • VABVernepliktig akademisk befal (rulleføres av Forsvarets sanitet. Saniteten trenger i hovedsak leger som vernepliktig akademisk befal, men ordningen gjelder også tannleger, prester, psykologer, farmasøyter og veterinærer.
  • VEUDen vest-europeiske union
  • VPVVernepliktsverket
  • VTOL"Vertical take-off and landing" (dvs flytype som kan ta av og lande vertikalt, uten rullebane)
  • WEAGWestern European Armaments Group
  • WPWarszawapakten (oppløst i 1991)
  • ØKNØverstkommanderende i Nord-Norge
  • ØKSØverstkommanderende i Sør-Norge



19.03.2004


FFI explains al-Qaida document

Since the Madrid bombings on 11 March there has been considerable media interest in a document found on radical islamist websites some months ago by researchers at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI).

The document recommends "painful strikes" against Spanish "forces" specifically around the time of the Spanish elections and there has naturally been much speculation about the relationship between this text and the Madrid events.

Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer now present some clarifications and reflections on the significance of the 42-page Arabic document called "Jihadi Iraq, Hopes and Dangers".



Date and origin of the document
According to the author, a provisional draft of the document was finished in September 2003, but it was not published until approximately 10 December. FFI’s Brynjar Lia came across the document in December on website called "Global Islamic Media" which regularly posts various kinds of radical islamist texts. Lia then skimmed the document and interpreted it as a strategy document intended for the islamist resistance within Iraq.

However, just after the Madrid bombings Brynjar Lia recalled the document and started analysing it in more detail with his colleague Thomas Hegghammer. The detailed reading provided many interesting new insights, particularly when coupled with details from the investigation of the Madrid attacks.

Authorship and audience
According to the heading of the document, it was prepared by the "Media Committee for the Victory of the Iraqi People (Mujahidin Services Centre)". This entity is previously unknown, but the reference to a "services centre" (markaz al-khidamat) echoes the "Services Bureau" (maktab al-khidamat), the organisation from which al-Qaida grew in the late 1980s. The document is written by a single person whose name does not appear anywhere in the document. However, the text contains a dedication to Yusuf al-Ayiri and several quotations from his books.

Yusuf al-Ayiri was a key al-Qaida ideologist and media coordinator who was killed by Saudi security forces in May 2003. The fact that al-Ayiri is the only named person to receive a dedication in the document, and the fact that the author strongly recommends reading al-Ayiri’s books indicate that the author was either part of the circle around al-Ayiri, or would like to be associated with his ideological legacy. Al-Ayiri wrote extensively on the Iraq war and his style was characterized by a very pragmatic military and political approach to jihad. His books paid little attention to religious and theological issues.

Jihadi Iraq, Hopes and Dangers is similarly pragmatic and analytical, and this further suggest that the author is at least of the same ideological orientation of al-Ayiri, who was closely associated with al-Qaida. At several points in the text the author says "we think" or "we find", suggesting perhaps that the "Mujahidin Services Centre" does indeed refer to a closed circle of al-Qaida followers.

The document is also dedicated more generally to islamists who have fought in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia and Iraq. This indicates that the text is not intended for internal organisational use but rather seeks to provide general strategic advice to a wider international audience of radical islamists. At the same time, the author presumes that the readers share his underlying ideological vision, because he does not deal with theological justifications for the strategy he proposes.

Like al-Ayiri, the author sees no reason to spend time preaching to the choir about the need to wage jihad against the crusaders. He cuts straight to the crucial issue, namely how should the Mujahidin proceed in practical terms in order to oust the occupation forces from Iraq ? Thus he remains faithful to the subtitle of the document: "(A review of) the practical steps for the blessed jihad".

Major themes
The main thesis proposed in the document is that America cannot be coerced to leave Iraq by military-political means alone, but the Islamist resistance can succeed if it makes the occupation of Iraq as costly as possible - in economic terms - for the United States.

The document therefore offers a number of specific "policy recommendations" in order to increase the economic impact of the insurgency and the jihadi campaign in Iraq. The most important of these recommendations consists of trying to limit the number of American allies present in Iraq, because America must not be allowed to share the cost of occupation with a wide coalition of countries. If the mujahidin can force US allies to withdraw from Iraq then America will be left to cover the expenses on her own, which she cannot sustain for very long. The intermediary strategic goal is therefore to make one or two of the US allies leave the coalition, because this will cause others to follow suit and the dominos will start falling.

The document then analyses three countries (Britain, Spain and Poland) in depth, with a view to identifying the weakest link or the domino piece most likely to fall first. The author provides a surprisingly informed and nuanced analysis of the domestic political map in each country. He argues that each country will react differently to violent attacks against its forces because of domestic political factors:

Poland, for example, is unlikely to withdraw from the coalition because there is political consensus on foreign policy, and the country has a very high tolerance for human casualties.

Britain is easier to force out of Iraq, because the popular opposition to the war and the occupation is so high. However, the author estimates that Britain will only withdraw from Iraq in one of two cases: either if Britain suffers significant human casualties in Iraq or if Spain and Italy withdraws first.

Spain on the other hand is very vulnerable to attacks on its forces, primarily because public opposition to the war is almost total, and the government is virtually on its own on this issue. The author therefore identifies Spain as the weakest link in the coalition.

References to Spain
The author devotes 6 out of 42 pages to a review of the domestic political situation in Spain. In the process he displays a knowledge of and interest in Spanish society which is striking. We do not know whether the author himself has intimate knowledge of Spanish politics or whether he is plagiarising good secondary sources. However, the very fact that he deems such a high level of detail necessary for his argument indicates that we are dealing with a politically very developed mind. It must also be noted that of the three case studies, the chapter on Spain is by far the best in terms of analytical clarity.

The most interesting passage of the whole text is the author’s concluding remarks regarding Spain:

"Aznar’s position does not express the Spanish popular stance, and if the disparity between the government and the people were at the same percentage rate in Britain, then the government would fall. But this has not happened thus far, for a number of reasons, including:

- That the Spanish people, despite the passing of more than quarter of a century of democracy, has not reached the level of e.g. Britain in terms of accountability of its rulers. So far it (the people) has accepted the lies of the politicians as the truth and it does not see a reason for holding them accountable. This is contrary to the British who try to hold Blair accountable for his lies in making a case for Britain’s entry in the war on Iraq.

- That most of the rightist electorate are very loyal to their party. Despite the fact that the vast majority of the Spanish opposed the war, in the last local elections the Popular party electorate voted for their party and remained loyal to it.

- The power of the group Opus Dei in the Popular Party..

- The lack of direct influence of the Iraq events on life in Spain...

- The weakness of the leftist opposition and the failure of mounting a political struggle.


Therefore we say that in order to force the Spanish government to withdraw from Iraq the resistance should deal painful blows to its forces. This should be accompanied by an information campaign clarifying the truth of the matter inside Iraq. It is necessary to make utmost use of the upcoming general election in Spain in March next year.

We think that the Spanish government could not tolerate more than two, maximum three blows, after which it will have to withdraw as a result of popular pressure. If its troops still remain in Iraq after these blows, then the victory of the Socialist Party is almost secured, and the withdrawal of the Spanish forces will be on its electoral programme.

Lastly, we are emphasise that a withdrawal of the Spanish or Italian forces from Iraq would put huge pressure on the British presence (in Iraq), a pressure that Toni Blair might not be able to withstand, and hence the domino tiles would fall quickly. Yet, the basic problem of making the first tile fall still remains."


(The passage is underlined and in bold types in the Arabic original)

Relationship with the Madrid events
The document’s significance derives first of all from the way in which it might be linked to the Madrid events. FFI’s researchers think it is likely that the perpetrators of the attacks knew this document in some way or other. There are three reasons for this.

First of all, the document highlights Spain as the politically most convenient target of the coalition countries present in Iraq, and it specifically mentions the Spanish elections as a good time to strike.

Second, the recommendation to strike Spanish forces does not exclude attacks on other types of Spanish targets in other parts of the world. The perpetrators may have adopted the overall strategy outlined in the document while altering the tactics somewhat and taking the campaign onto Spanish territory. After all, the author makes a point out of the fact that the Iraq war has so far not affected life in Spain ("..lack of direct influence of the Iraq events on life in Spain"). Moreover, the fact that the document is addressed to global jihadists, and that it was posted on the "Global Islamic Media" website indicates that its scope went way beyond the Iraqi battlefield.

Third, the man who assumes responsibility for the attacks appears on a video under the name Abu Dujana al-Afghani, echoing a reference to the historical Abu Dujana on page 2 of the document, which goes as follows: "Verily (the crusaders) do not and will not be turned away (from aggression against Islam) except by the youth who have sold their souls to God Almighty, and who have put on the headband of death ... the headband of Abu Dujana".

Abu Dujana was one of the companions of the Prophet Muhammad and known as a brave fighter. His trademark was a red headband known as the "headband of death" (‘asbat al-mawt), which he wound around his helmet before going into battle. For this reason "Abu Dujana" has sometimes been used as an alias by mujahidin in various parts of the world. In this case, however, we cannot exclude the possibility that the person on the videotape has chosen the alias Abu Dujana after reading this document. Alternatively, perhaps it is the author who deliberately hints at the Moroccan-Spanish cell by mentioning Abu Dujana.

One must always be very careful to link anonymous ideological texts with specific events on the ground, especially when the texts contain few operational details. One by one, the abovementioned the points of convergence are not enough to link the document to the attacks. However, when the indications are considered as a whole and coupled with details from the investigation such as the videotape, a very interesting picture emerges. This leads us to suggest that we are dealing with a text which served as ideological inspiration and policy guidance for the terrorist attacks in Madrid.




 

Relaterte artikler


Dokumenter




"Jihadi Iraq, Hopes and Dangers" (pdf)